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BOOK REVIEW
HOLMES'S LEGACY AND THE NEW
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
8

HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888-1910. By Owen M.
Fiss. 1 New York: Macmillan, Inc. 1993. PP. xix, 426. $75.00.

Reviewed by Eben Moglen 2
The most significant collaborative effort in the literature of American constitutional history, the Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History
of the Supreme Court of the United States, is nearing completion. A
generation has passed since the appearance of the first volume, authored by Julius Goebel, Jr.,3 and (after many vicissitudes affecting
several of the works in the series) the appearance of this volume
marks the antepenultimate stage. Though Professor Fiss's remarkable
achievement deserves to be viewed primarily on the basis of its own
merits as a study of the Fuller Court, a just appreciation of its contribution to the literature requires us to explore two historiographic questions: the book's place within the intergenerational effort that Holmes
inspired and its contribution to the very active contemporary reexamination of the jurisprudence usually epitomized by reference to Lochner
v. New York. 4 Viewed against the historiographic background, I submit that Troubled Beginnings of the Modern State is a splendid example of this trend in American constitutional history in our time. In
what follows, I attempt to describe the book's role in the new scholarly synthesis and to indicate the respects in which I find myself not
entirely in agreement, both with the book and with the synthesis it so
ably represents. But, though it delays us somewhat in taking up the
book's substantive content, we should first consider the great significance of finding a book like this as part of the Holmes Devise History
at all.

1 Sterling Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
2 Professor of Law & Legal History, Columbia University Law School, Visiting Professor,
Harvard Law School, 1994-95. My thanks to Morton Horwitz and Pamela S. Karlan for their
contributions to the evolution of this essay.
3 1 JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801 (1971).

4 x98 U.S. 45 (io5).
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SHORT HISTORY OF THE HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY

Nothing Justice Holmes ever did so bewildered the United States
Government as his final decision: to make the United States his residuary legatee. It took twenty years for the wheels of government to
grind out an appropriate employment for the more than $250,000
Holmes bestowed on his puzzled country.5 Once Congress had created
the Permanent Committee for the Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise and
made an appropriation to cover the embarrassing absence of accrued
interest during years of uncharacteristic congressional indecision about
what to do with money, it took another fifteen years for the first of
the volumes in the multi-volume History
of the Supreme Court of the
6
appearance.
its
make
to
States
United
Initially, the Devise Committee, substantially influenced by the
opinions and energy of Justice Felix Frankfurter, 7 selected among the
proposed authors of the respective volumes (in addition to several of
the Justice's former law clerks) a number of legal historians whose
careers had already involved significant research commitments in the
areas of specialization required. Not only Julius Goebel, Jr., but also
Carl Brent Swisher, Charles Fairman and George Lee Haskins conformed to this model to a greater or lesser degree. 8 For several of
these scholars the Holmes Devise volume was the summation of a
scholarly career, representing the last major publication of a long lifetime in the field.
Both as a consequence of the research investment of the authors,
and also as a result of the vision of institutional history that prevailed
in their generation, a distinctive property of the early volumes of the
Holmes Devise History was bulk. Thousand-page volumes became an
unofficial standard, and Professor Fairman produced the equivalent of
more than two such volumes without exhausting his material; he required an additional 2oo-page volume to discuss the work of the five
Justices whose Electoral Commission decided the disputed Presidential
election of 1 8 7 6 .9 Archival research swelled not only the volumes but
the duration of their production: Goebel's bibliography listed almost
S See Act of Aug. 5, 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-246, §§ 1-2, 69 Stat. 533, 533.
6 See GOEBEL, supra note 3, at iv.
7 G. Edmund White, a second-generation author who took over his project from Gerald
Gunther, Frankfurter's former law clerk, commented on the role of Justice Frankfurter in the
selection of the Devise historians. See 3-4 G. EDWARD WHITE WITH THE AID OF GERALD GuNTHER, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE MARSHALL COURT AND
CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-1835, at xix-xx (1988).
8 See id. at xx.
9 See 6 CHARLES FAiRmAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864-1888 PART ONE (1971); 7 CHARLES FAIRMAN, HISTORY
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864-1888
PART TWO (1987); 7 CHARLES FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: FIVE JUSTICES AND THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION OF 1877 (Supp. 1988).
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ninety major collections of manuscripts consulted, apart from federal

judicial records, 10 while Gerald Gunther's archival research on the
later Marshall Court consumed the better part of two decades and
eventuated in several thousand pages of unpublished and apparently
unpublishable commentary." Within this somewhat extensive compass, the early volumes of the History were predictably addressed to
the industry, patience, and intellectual needs of specialists. Entombed
within them lay an exhaustive narrative reconstruction of the work of
the Supreme Court in many of its most important periods. The degree
of thematic coherence imparted to the material varied, but in no case
did Justice Holmes's money seem to have been invested in a way that
could profit the generally educated population of the nation in the
slightest. For the legal historians of my generation, who began our
professional educations in the later 1970s or early ig8os, having cut
our teeth (and worn them down) on the Devise History was part of
the pain and glory of the historian's Bildung. And yet I suspect without intention to incriminate - that not all my contemporaries actually completed the task.
The necessary revolution in the conception of the Holmes Devise
History was begun in 1985 by G. Edward White and superintended
by the History's General Editor, Stanley N. Katz. With the passing of
the pre-World War II institutionalists and the former law clerks to
Justice Frankfurter, a new vision of the role of the History, and indeed of constitutional history generally, could emerge. White reduced
the planned two volumes on the later Marshall Court into one, and
although that one consumed the usual thousand pages, this represented, after all, a fifty percent reduction of the pre-existing expectations. More important, his book departed fundamentally from the
pattern of exhaustive institutional description and adopted a self-consciously revisionist interpretive posture. With a thunderclap, fresh air
entered the Devise. In a development previously unimaginable, a
lengthy but manageable abridgment was issued by the Oxford University Press in paperback. 12 The Holmes Devise History was now aimed
at non-specialists and students.
This revolution is very much furthered by the present volume. It
may seem peculiar to celebrate the brevity and coherence of a 400page monograph, but I have taken readers on the present journey to
explain why hearts (including mine) leapt at the very sight of the
book. Sometimes, despite the proverb, intelligent judgment of a book
begins with the shape of the cover.
10 See GOEBEL, supra note 3, at 815-i9.
11 See WimTE WiTH GUNTHER, supra note 7, at xvii.
12 G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-1835 (abr. ed.

'99').
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TROUBLED BEGINNINGS AND THE NEW SYNTHESIS

In approaching Fiss's work, then, we must remember that we are
reading a synthetic work for a wider non-specialist audience, but a
work that is explicitly dedicated to making thematic arguments about
the role of the Supreme Court from the i88os to the eve of the Wilson
Administration. In a distinguished scholarly career, this is the author's
first extended foray into history-writing, and it will no doubt stand as
one of the most impressive such debuts of its generation. The mechanism of the scholarship reflects both the revolution in purpose and the
professional locale of the author: manuscript sources (with the partial
exception of the Holmes Papers at Harvard Law School) are not heavily relied upon; secondary literature - particularly on the surrounding
political and social history - has a tendency to collect in lengthy
string citations in the opening footnotes of each chapter, rather than
forming an intimate part of the analysis from point to point and page
to page. This latter tendency is probably an advantage to students
and others seeking to compile easily a bibliography of related and supplementary reading, but it somewhat defeats the book's obvious intention -

in reaction against earlier volumes in the series -

to put

Supreme Court constitutional history securely back into its larger
context.
Fiss's touch is sure, on the other hand, in describing the relation
between constitutional theory as he finds it in the cases of the Fuller
Court and the constitutional theory of the later twentieth century. The
constitutional law literature of our own time is woven throughout the
book 13 and is in constant dialogue with the text in precisely the way
the contemporary social history of late nineteenth-century America is
not. The distinctions between constitutional theory after 1937 or 1954
and the constitutional thought of the Fuller Court provide Fiss with
his overarching themes and form the predominant subjects of his brief
opening and concluding chapters (pp. 9-2I, 389-95). It is the pursuit
of these themes which joins Fiss's work to other recent attempts to
understand this epoch in the development of our constitutional law.
A.

Liberty, the Fuller Court, and the Progressive Agenda

At the center of Fiss's history is the claim "that the Fuller Court
should be understood as an institution devoted to liberty and determined to protect that particular constitutional ideal from the social
movements of the day" (p. 12). In pursuing this interpretive position,
Fiss says, he "labor[s] uneasily against a scholarly tradition that treats
all the talk of liberty by the Fuller Court as mere camouflage or sub13 For example, Fiss cites the work of Bruce Ackerman (pp. ii n.43, 393 n.9), John Ely (p.
ii), Gerald Gunther (pp. 161 n.22, 328 n.28), Paul Kahn (pp. 258 n.7, 393 n.9), and Frank
Michelman (p. 9 n.33).
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terfuge and insists that Fuller and his colleagues were simply using
their power to further class interests" (p. 12). Whether these are the
interpretive alternatives is a subject to which I shall return below, but
Fiss energetically and effectively pursues his chosen conceptions
through the record of the Supreme Court's response to the tide of legal
and political agitation we call progressivism.
For Fiss, the Fuller Court's treatment of the legal effects of progressivism - including the Sherman Act, 14 wage and hours legislation
such as that involved in Lochner, and rate regulation - disproves the
notion that a crass form of class justice motivated the Court (pp.
103-O6). The Court's aggressive interpretation of the Sherman Act between Trans-Missouri Freight's and Northern Securities16 shows the
Court's willingness to accommodate progressive measures by expanding the reach of the Commerce Clause as a limitation of due process liberty interests, so that "the commerce and due process inquiries
became coextensive, and due process became the secondary or
subordinate category" (p. iio). Though Fiss perceives a Court troubled by progressive reliance on legislation, because statutes are "the
embodiment of will rather than of reason" (p. 105), protection of the
liberty-enhancing value of competition brought the Court to favor a
strong view of congressional intention in forbidding any restraint of
trade in interstate commerce (pp. 113-14). This view of antitrust doctrine, which prevailed for slightly less than seven years, definitively
answers, in Fiss's opinion, the instrumental accounts of the Fuller
Court's encounter with antitrust (p. 117).' 7 This doctrine was muddied by the Court's response to the "special threat to liberty and federalism in President Roosevelt's effort to undo the effort of James J. Hill
and J.P. Morgan to merge two rail lines" at stake in Northern Securities (p. iio). Only a "new synthesis" achieved by Justice White in
Standard Oil8 and American Tobacco' 9 reconciled the tension between
liberty interests. The Court read the word "reasonable" into the statute and "mooted the constitutional objection based on liberty by inserting the constitutional protection of liberty within the terms of the
statute itself" (p. iio-ii).
For Fiss, this view of the early history of the Sherman Act is of
great importance in offsetting the otherwise disquieting implications of
Lochner and Lochnerism, which it is Fiss's polemic purpose to rescue
from the untender mercies of the progressive historians. Cherishing
14 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-

7

(1988).

IS United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, i66 U.S. 290 (1897).
16 Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
17 Fiss uses "instrumental" and "instrumentalist" as labels for the scholarship that asserts that
class interest motivated the Fuller Court (pp. 12-i9). The soundness of this interpretive nomenclature is discussed below at note 24 and accompanying text.
18 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (191I).
19 United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. io6 (Igi1).
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liberty at the expense of the "technocratic" ambitions of progressive
politics - which invoked will rather than reason through the process
of legislation - is a sentiment with which Fiss can identify. The crux
of his book is the devotion of his formidable skills of explication and
analysis to show that the Justices who found the Sherman Act's expansion of the commerce power into the zone of otherwise protected
liberty acceptable found the intrusion of the States' police power into
the same areas through wage and hours legislation or rate regulation
insupportable, because the state invocations of the police power more
fundamentally upset a neutrally defined conception of liberty: "L'ochner sought to say clearly and unequivocally that the legislative power
was indeed limited, and to do so during a time when those limits were
being called dramatically into question by the progressive movement"
(p. 165). Fiss contends that if the Court had been consciously engaged
in the mere protection of private economic privilege, the antitrust
cases would have come out like Lochner and Ex parte Young. 20 Instead, the Court defended liberty, meaning limits on the power of
majoritarian institutions - a neutral or non-instrumental activity.
Any evaluation of this interpretation must begin with an inquiry into
the nature of the "liberty" that the Court, in Fiss's view, defended.
B.

Liberty and the "Social Contract Tradition"

As Fiss sees it, the concept of liberty in the era of the Fuller Court
was defined by reference to what Fiss calls "the social contract tradition." A precise definition of the meaning of liberty in "the social contract tradition" appears inconveniently late in the book, at the
beginning of the concluding chapter. Until that point we are assumed
to know, I think, what it is on the basis of its results in the cases, its
"implicit" appearances in the speeches of Justices and the arguments of
counsel, and Fiss's occasional reference to John Locke. Fiss defines
liberty as follows:
In this tradition, liberty was conceived of as something that belonged
personally to the individual, like a special kind of property or possession.
Liberty was something that could be enjoyed even by individuals who
lived outside organized society and who met their needs through their
own labors and by barter and exchange....
The social contract tradition was also defined by its reduction of liberty to a demand for limited government. The state was seen as the
natural enemy of freedom, prohibiting individuals from doing whatever
they wished, setting limits on their conduct, or requisitioning their
property ....
In . . .cases [such as those in which the Court struck down wages

and hours legislation or the income tax,] government power - that of
the states as well as the federal government - was held to be limited to
20 Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (i9o8).
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the accomplishment of discrete, previously specified ends. As in the
fables of classical social contract theory, government was seen as a deliberate contrivance, and the constitutive process that brought the state into
being also set the limits on its authority (pp. 389-9o).
The essence of this point, of course, is the identification between
liberty and limited government. It is not, to be sure, an unfamiliar
one; Fiss could have followed any number of earlier writers and established the connection between the two conceptions by pointing out, as
he does not, that the leading constitutional treatise in the last third of
the nineteenth century (seven editions of which appeared before i91o)
21
was universally known as "Cooley's Constitutional Limitations."
The concept of limited government is also denoted in Fiss's account
by the phrase "constitutive authority," which means authority "artificially or deliberately created to serve discrete ends" (p. 158). Lochner
and the other monuments of the Fuller Court are then coherent, principled delineations of the limits of constitutive authority, through
which the Court expressed a purely contractarian vision. "[L]iberty of
contract . . . was, in the end, not a principle from which limits on
state power were derived, but rather the space or area left to the individual after the reasons for the creation of state power were exhausted" (p. 159).
Thus the critical burden Fiss's account must carry is to show that
limitation on government arose in this intellectual system from consent, as a consequence of "social contract" rather than as a result of
man's possession of natural rights. If, as Fiss also says, liberty existed
for these thinkers "outside organized society," then the task for the historian of ideas becomes even more urgently to establish the presence of
specifically contractarian notions.
And it is just here, unfortunately, that Fiss has the most difficulty
with his argument. "Themes implicit in the social contract tradition"
are discovered in many places, including quite surprisingly "in social
Darwinism" (p. 47), but the problem of locating their explicit expression remains somewhat vexing for him. Fiss refers often to a speech
by Justice David Brewer, delivered at Albany in January 1893,
strongly defending the role of the courts in preventing the coercive
redistribution of property through mass labor agitation. Brewer's
words are said to reflect the view that "the consent exalted by social
contract theory is not one constantly open to revision (as in the electo21 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST

UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION (ist ed. 1868). One of
the interesting features of Fiss's approach is his lack of interest in the relations between the
Supreme Court and the academic legal culture. This might be more comprehensible in a work of
narrower institutional focus with less ambition to interpretive synthesis. It is odd to read a modem book about the Supreme Court in the Lochner era in which Cooley figures only in relation to
the Interstate Commerce Commission (pp. 186, 196-97), while Christopher Tiedeman (and, for
that matter, Christopher Columbus Langdell) are never mentioned at all.
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ral process), but rather one that binds over time, in the face of
changed conditions and changed minds" (pp. 81-82). But when Fiss
comes to consider closely the text of the speech itself, nary a word of
contractarian rhetoric does he quote (pp. 53-57). To say, as Brewer
did, that what "differentiate[s] the civilized man from the savage" is
"that which he knows, that which he is, and that which he has," (p.
53) is not to demonstrate a contractarian approach. Similarly, Fiss
quotes Joseph Choate arguing against the validity of the income tax
before the Supreme Court in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.: "I
have thought that one of the fundamental objects of all civilized government was the preservation of the rights of private property. I have
thought that it was the very keystone of the arch upon which all civilized government rests, and that this once abandoned, everything was
at stake and in danger" (p. 81).22 Fiss says of this passage: "In speaking of preservation of property as 'one of the fundamental objects of
all civilized government,' Choate echoed Brewer's Albany speech and
implicitly drew on the principles enshrined in the social contract tradition" (p. 81). But to invoke the idea that one of the purposes of government is to protect property is not to draw on specifically
contractarian principles, any more than it would be contractarian to
suggest that a civilized government protects liberty of speech or religious worship. The reference from Choate's argument to Brewer's
speech merely compounds an assertion. Perhaps both are examples of
"the social contract tradition," but neither one is provably so on the
basis of Fiss's analysis.
Indeed, it seems to me that Fiss at least owes us consideration of
the alternative -

and somewhat more common -

theory that these

passages, and other judicial and non-judicial expressions of opinion in
the period, are examples of something a little different from "the social
contract tradition," namely a belief in natural rights. That concept is
curiously absent from this book, appearing in only one place, in connection with the use of the phrase by Justice Brown in his opinion in
the central component of the Insular Cases, Downes v. Bidwell.2 3 Fiss
may be right to believe that the concept of liberty in the Fuller Court
is primarily traceable to social contract ideas, and he may be equally
534 (1895).
U.S. 244 (I9O1). Justice Brown offered the theory that congressional legislation in the

22 157 U.S. 429,
23 x82

newly acquired possessions would be limited by "natural" as opposed to "artificial or remedial"
rights, see id. at 282-83. For Fiss's discussion of the case, see pp. 239-4o. It is interesting to
compare Fiss's index, which gives 45 primary references to "social contract tradition" and one
reference to "natural rights," with that of another recent work on legal thought over a somewhat
longer period, MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERiCAN LAW, 1870-1960:
THE CmsIs OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY (1992), which gives 49 primary references to "natural rights"
and none to "social contract." This is not, I believe, an artifact of publishers' index-making. It
ought to be said, for completeness of analysis, that Horwitz's book is nowhere cited or mentioned
by Fiss. As is invariably the case with quantitative evidence, readers must attach their own
significance to the numbers.
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right to ignore altogether the possible influence of natural rights theories on the judges. But his case on this important point could have
been stronger, and something was to be gained by a less inarticulate
dismissal of the alternative. An approach to the jurisprudence of the
late nineteenth century that emphasizes the role of natural rights ideas
has some advantages, as I shall try to show below.
C. Rehabilitating the Fuller Court
Fiss's success in his central task as a doctrinal historian - the
elucidation of the Supreme Court's varied approaches to the protection
of liberty in the public law of the era - bears out his argument that a
purely "instrumentalist" vision of the Court, taking as its end the preservation of class privilege, fails to account fully for the actual development of constitutional doctrine. But as Fiss acknowledges,
maintaining that the Court's talk of liberty was "mere camouflage or
subterfuge" (p. 12) is not the most intellectually significant position:
Those inclined toward the instrumental hypothesis might concede that
the reasoning offered by the justices in their opinions was not crafted to
mislead, at least not on any conscious level .... The justices . . .may
have genuinely struggled over the meaning of the constitutional ideal of
liberty, but that ideal itself, so instrumentalists might now argue, was
shaped by class interests that operated in the background and at a
deeper level. In this view class interests were the structural determinants
of the ideal of liberty (pp. 17-18).
Leaving aside the use of the term "instrumental" for a moment,
Fiss here concedes that his most significant interpretive task is to convince the doubter who asserts not the insincerity of the Justices, but
rather the importance of socially structured constraints on legal
thought. Whether such a position implies that the judges are "instrumentalists" is open to doubt: accepting that the end they had in view
was liberty only, the alternative interpretation asserts that they pursued this goal within an intellectual context determined in substantial
24
measure by their social locale.
Nor is the only possible version of such an argument one in which
"class interests" operate "in the background and at a deeper level."
Other aspects of social organization also condition the thought
processes of judges, a subject to which I return below. Rightly, however, Fiss sees common ground between progressive historians and
New Deal constitutionalists in the creation of such an account of the
Fuller Court. For Fiss, the intellectual realignment of the New Deal
period required the creation of a constitutional mythology in which the
work of the Fuller Court, symbolized by Lochner, was stigmatized as
reactionary class-interested instrumentalism devoid of intellectual re24 1 assume that the reference to those arguing for such an interpretive hypothesis as "instrumentalists" is merely an uncaught error.
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sponsibility. With Brown v. Board of Education,2- Fiss maintains, dissonance built up within that interpretive position:
It was as though the Fuller and Warren Courts were locked in a dialectic
across history ....

Oddly enough, however, in time the dialectic took a

new turn and began to reverse itself. As Brown became more fully absorbed into the national political and legal culture and assumed an almost axiomatic quality, Lochner began to appear in a new light. Those
who, like myself, took Brown as their starting point, began to wonder
whether Lochner was in fact mistaken.... [O]ver time Brown appeared
as an invitation to reexamine the settlement of 1937, to wonder whether
the use of the judicial power affirmed by Lochner and by the other decisions of the Fuller Court was in fact illegitimate. This work takes up
that invitation (p. 12).
And in doing so it is not alone. While ultimately maintaining the
view that Brown passes some test of constitutional propriety that
Lochner fails, Fiss joins many other constitutional theorists and historians of this generation in seeking to transcend the crabbed view of
the Fuller Court that was one of the least attractive legacies of Legal
Realism and progressive history. Morton Horwitz, Bruce Ackerman,
Cass Sunstein and others have contributed to a more balanced view of
the works of what Horwitz called "Classical Legal Thought" during
what I think it is still proper to refer to as the Gilded Age. 26 Fiss, in
speaking of reconsidering the "legitimacy" of those decisions, associates
himself more with the enterprise of constitutional theory than with
constitutional history, but as he properly notes, "[t]he question of validity remains outside the scope of this book" (p. 19).
Not all of those reconsidering the history are motivated to take a
more charitable view of the results. To Horwitz, for example, to understand is scarcely to forgive. Fiss too expresses the hope that his
work will not be taken as an apology, as distinguished from "return[ing] to the words of the justices .. .plac[ing] them in a concep-

tual framework and historical context that render[s] them meaningful"
(p. 12). In saying, therefore, that the present work consolidates and

places within the compass of the Holmes Devise History the emerging
revisionist view of the Fuller Court, I am not speaking of a wholesale
change in attitude toward the Court's holdings. The essence of the
revision is captured in Fiss's rejection of what he calls the "instrumentalist" view, instead emphasizing the creative and intellectually coher27
ent aspects of the Court's doctrinal positions.
25 347 U.S. 483 (I954).
26 See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 151-2 (1991); HORWITZ,

supra note 23, at 9-32; Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873 passim (1987).
27 I have previously commented on the ways in which recent works by Horwitz and Ackerman have contributed to this spirit of revision. See Eben Moglen, The Incompleat Burkean:
Bruce Ackerman's Foundationfor Constitutional History, 5 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 531 (x993)
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In one very important respect, however, the interpretive diversity
of the revision is greater than had previously appeared. This is the
significance of Fiss's attribution of the Fuller Court's conception of
liberty to the "social contract tradition." Horwitz and Ackerman agree
that the creative jurisprudence of the Fuller Court came about
through the integration of natural law concepts, and both also agree
that these concepts were the outcome of the Fourteenth Amendment's
language and intellectual background. 28 For Fiss natural law conceptions are not important enough to mention, much less to be the main-

spring of the Fuller Court's intellectual machinery. 29 Because the
book does not address the difference between its own interpretation
30
and the one advanced by the most influential contemporary studies,
we can only hope that further writings will shed some light on the
sources and degrees of disagreement.
Even more important than the disagreement over the roots of the
Fuller Court's conception of liberty, however, is Fiss's treatment of
what he calls the "instrumental" argument (p. 15). This analysis raises
a question going to the heart of his version of the new synthesis:
should we accept an intellectual history of public law in late nineteenth-century America in which neither class considerations nor other
socioeconomic interests operated "in the background or at a deeper
level" as "structural determinants of the ideal of liberty"? For Horwitz, whose work focuses its attention on private rather than public
law, the answer is almost certainly negative: one primary goal of his
account of Legal Classicism is the elucidation of those structural determinants of private law doctrine in the period Fiss writes about. One
of my regrets about Horwitz's Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy is that it did
not broaden its focus to include consideration of the full range of
Fourteenth Amendment doctrine in the Progressive Era.3 1 Fiss is but
one of the scholars who would have profited, I think, from an opportunity to consider such a presentation. For my own part, while by no
means out of sympathy with Fiss's primary goal - to free the history
of the Fuller Court from the distorting narratives of the New Deal Era
(book review); Eben Moglen, The Transformation of Morton Horwitz, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 1042,
1057-59 (1993) (book review) [hereinafter Moglen, Transformation].
28 See ACKERMAN, supra note 26, at 99-io3; HORWITZ, supra note 23, at i58.
29 The relation of the particular natural law arguments developed by the antebellum antislavery movement to the text and subsequent doctrinal development of the Fourteenth Amendment
was central to the interpretation of the most significant recent scholarship on the subject, WLLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL
DOCTRINE (1988). Fiss nowhere refers to Nelson's book.
30 Perhaps Fiss believes that natural law ideology was an integral part of his "social contract
tradition." This would be problematic, in view of his assertion that "liberty of contract ... was,
in the end, not a principle from which limits on state power were derived, but rather the space or
area left to the individual after the reasons for the creation of state power were exhausted" (p.
I59). This seems squarely in conflict with a natural rights view.
31 See Moglen, Transformation, supra note 27, at 1058-59.
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I think to omit consideration of structural limitations of the Justices' thought is a serious weakness.
-

I. FAILURES OF JUDICIAL

IMAGINATION:

A NEW NEW

SYNTHESIS

It merely states the obvious to point out that the American socioeconomic landscape of i9oo was wildly different from that of 186o.
Business enterprises unprecedented in scale, employing concentrations
of capital and numbers of workers beyond the imagining of previous
generations, had become commonplace. Confrontations between organizations of workers and the massed power of employers grew increasingly bitter, and private armed forces were used, from the steel mills
of Pennsylvania to the copper mines of the intermountain west, to intimidate, coerce, or even fire upon striking workers. By 1894, with the
economy gripped by the most severe contractions in American economic history up to that point, the possibility of a general social confrontation between labor and capital loomed frighteningly near.
Between 187o and 1914, the United States absorbed more than 25 million immigrants in one of the greatest demographic movements in
human history.3 2 At the turn of the century, new technologies of production, transportation, and communication permitted further expansions of private economic power.
Yet during the same period, the Supreme Court crafted a series of
constitutional doctrines designed to rein in what was asserted to be a
significant danger posed by overweening public power. Explaining
this disjunction is the central problem for the historian of late nineteenth-century public law; rather than explaining it, the Fiss version of
the new synthesis chooses to explain it away. The "instrumentalist"
view attributed to the progressive historians whom he rejects would at
least confront the problem: judges and lawyers, but especially the Justices of the Supreme Court, were conscious allies of the new private
economic powers, and their constitutional doctrine was deliberately directed at defeating majoritarian movements in the state and federal
legislatures intended to redress the imbalance between civil society and
the state. For Fiss, as for the rest of the scholars loosely comprising
what I have called the new synthesis, this view taken by two generations of progressive historians is defective. But at the end of the day
Fiss's replacement is no more satisfactory. To say that the Justices
neutrally pursued a long-standing conception of liberty - whether one
allied to social contractarianism as Fiss maintains, or to natural rights
ideology as other writers have believed - is no advance unless it is
accompanied by a more complete analysis of how that conception of

32

See

UNITED

STATES BUREAU

OF THE CENSUS,

THE STATISTICAL HISTORY

UNITED STATES, FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT

05--06

(1976).

OF THE
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liberty so skewed the judicial vision that the disparity between public
and private power was perceived counterfactually.
This is the difficulty with Fiss's antistructuralist form of intellectual history. "The social contract tradition," or for that matter "the
natural rights tradition" sat in no seats and decided no cases. Socially
situated human beings are the agents in any such narrative, and it is
precisely the forces that "operated in the background and at a deeper
level" in structuring their thought that the historian must call upon. A
review essay is the place for suggestions rather than conclusions; let
me offer two, very briefly outlining their possible role in the further
development of the new synthesis.
A.

The Stop in the Mind -

Looking Backward

In our legal culture, judges tend - barring such calculated Presidential indiscretions as one recent Supreme Court nomination - to be
people of relatively advanced age, bearing social judgments formed
and solidified through extensive experience with the established legal
institutions. One of the most common and comprehensible structural
limitations on judicial thought is a tendency to reason about the social
present

-

with which judges are often not very familiar

-

on the

basis of the social past as glimpsed during the decades of their active
social involvement. This means not only that judges reason from their
own personal experiences (explaining why former railroad lawyer
Pierce Butler rarely saw rate-making cases in the same way that Louis
Brandeis did), but also that in times of rapid social change the larger
social vision of the judges can become disconcertingly obsolete, rooted
in a vividly remembered but now quite irrelevant collective past.
Perhaps no American generation before our own - which in common with the rest of humanity is undergoing the most profound cultural transformation since the invention of writing - so thoroughly
experienced this effect as the generation educated before the Civil War
and sitting on the bench at the turn of the century. The greatest of
American autobiographies, The Education of Henry Adams, has this
cognitive and intellectual deracination as its primary subject.33 Perhaps none of the judges who decided In re Debs3 4 had held John

Quincy Adams's hand; but they knew the world the ex-President represented, where Quincy had not yet been vanquished by State Street,
and the chasm between Virginia and Massachusetts had not yet
opened wide enough to bury 66o,ooo people.
In my opinion, the most important feature of the thought of
Supreme Court Justices in the era Fiss describes is the almost unbroken record of failure in imagining and expressing the degree of post33 See HENRY ADAMS,

(1918).
34 158 U.S. 564 (1895).

THE EDUCATION OF HENRY ADAMs: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 497-98
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war social change. This failure of imagination, this stop in the judicial
mind, is not adequately described and can perhaps not even be fully
recognized through the elucidation of doctrinal positions. One can
flatter any doctrinal proposition, as a judge once said, by giving it a
logical form. The stop in the mind is more visible, operating as it does
in the background and at a deeper level, when one considers the literary aspects of judicial speech - the explanatory paradigms, the
images, the metaphors - which reveal more clearly than chains of
reasoning the inner processes of a judge's mind.
Read at this level, the new synthesis will find in the United States
Reports a record of imaginative obsolescence much more socially significant, if less profoundly expressed, than the inner torment of Henry
Adams. Let us consider, from this perspective, Debs. Fiss is exceedingly sympathetic to the Court's treatment of the Debs injunction, at
first glance astonishingly so. Debs's American Railway Union (ARU)
had, against the wishes of Debs and the rest of the leadership, chosen
to back the workers of the Pullman Palace Car Company by refusing
to cooperate in the movement of trains including Pullman cars. The
United States Government responded to the secondary strike by making a Special United States Attorney out of the lawyer for one of the
largest American railroads, whom it then backed in seeking an injunction to decapitate the strike by prohibiting the union's leaders, or anyone in sympathy with their goals, from "persuading," in any context,
anyone else to support the strike. The injunction was then enforced
not only through the arrest and imprisonment of Debs and others for
continuing to speak, but also through the mobilization of the United
States military - over the objection of the Governor of the State of
Illinois, the locus of disturbance - for the forcible resumption of normal railroad operations.
For Fiss, who devotes a chapter to approving of (but not, he says,
apologizing for) this result, the Court acted to preserve public order in
the face of civil war (pp. 53-74). He finds Debs's language inflammatory (Debs did indeed say that the use of the military to support
employers would result in civil war), though his chronology is scrupulous, and demonstrates the truth that - with one inconsiderable exception at Blue Island junction on July i, 1894 -

all the violence that

occurred in the ARU's confrontation with the railroads and the Gov5
ernment followed the injunction rather than preceded it.A
My concern is not with the doctrine or the result, but with what
the literature of the Court reveals about the background processes of
judicial rumination. The ARU's secondary strike against the railroads
3S Here, as elsewhere in the book, Fiss is unduly dismissive, in my opinion, of Arnold Paul,

whose discussion of the Debs crisis puts the Court's own actions in a fairly described context.
See ARNOLD PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW: ATTITUDES OF BAR AND

BENCH, 1887-1895, at 131-59 (First Harper Torchbook 1969) (ig6o).
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using the Chicago hub made real for the first time the social consequences of unregulated clashes between overwhelmingly powerful private economic power and the workers' collective option to withhold
their labor at the expense of their wages. One might expect, in this
connection, that the Supreme Court would say that "[c]onstitutional
provisions do not change, but their operation extends to new matters
as the modes of business and the habits of the life of the people vary
with each succeeding generation." 36 It did, in order to explain that the
government's power to enjoin obstructions of highways as nuisances
was not limited to waterways but extended also to land highways, despite the paucity of alternatives to Marshall-era admiralty situations as
precedents for enjoining such obstructions. The Debs rebellion was,
for all relevant purposes, a ditch that someone had impermissibly dug
across a highway, or an illegal dam thrown across navigable water.
For description of the central problem of industrial society, the Court
could rely only on pre-industrial metaphors:
The national government, given by the Constitution power to regulate
interstate commerce, has by express statute assumed jurisdiction over
such commerce when carried upon railroads. It is charged, therefore,
with the duty of keeping those highways of interstate commerce free
from obstruction, for it has always been recognized as one of the powers
and duties of a government
to remove obstructions from the highways
37
under its control.
No doubt the Court's failure to imagine alternative metaphors to describe the nature of the dispute was no more profound than that of the
other sectors of American government, almost equally impoverished in
their cognitive machinery for grasping the new social realities. It
never occurred to Richard Olney, I am sure, to deputize a lawyer as
Special United States Attorney for the purpose of enjoining George
Pullman from cutting wages and raising rents in his company town as
a method for relieving the obstruction in railroad traffic. Some tree
had fallen across a highway somewhere, and it was easier to cast Debs
than Pullman as a malicious woodsman. What doctrine might result
from alternative conceptualization is a counterfactual exercise for the
law school classroom. The task of the intellectual historian is limited
to pointing out the that metaphors judges are socialized to use significantly determine the range of available doctrinal outcomes.
Debs is but an example of an example, for it was not only in the
explanatory metaphors employed to visualize the new reality of labor
relations that the character of literary imagination affected the development of public law doctrine. At a deeper level there lay the problem of the metaphors used to depict the change in the American
economy as a whole. The construction of a national railroad network
36 In re Debs, 158 U.S. at 591.
37

Id. at 586.
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in the two decades following the end of the Civil War qualitatively
altered economic institutions and behavior patterns throughout the
38
United States.
As the cities of the East Coast were joined together in a network
connecting them to the interior through common lines, the central organizing principle of American commerce since the mid-eighteenth
century - competition among the riverine cities of the Atlantic and
Gulf littorals - was replaced by another, non-localist dynamic, whose
implications were grasped by the new titans of national industrial and
financial life, including Andrew Carnegie, John D. Rockefeller, and
J.P. Morgan. Yet to the Supreme Court, and the courts in general, the
railroad remained a "highway," and the vast, multi-jurisdictional corporate enterprises that it spawned remained "persons," whose status
under the Fourteenth Amendment was worked out under the cases following Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co.3 9 slightly
before the start of Fiss's period. Realization that neither these "roads"
nor these "persons" could be treated effectively within the terms established by the metaphor required long and bitter experience, gained in
40
the cases about which Fiss writes.
The cases of the Fuller Court are among the most important
sources from which to assess the effect of preindustrial metaphors on
social policy in the new industrial state. A full intellectual history of
antitrust, for example, awaits the abandonment of the econojargon of
recent years in preference for a study of the metaphors elucidating
"commerce" in the judicial mind. The mental image of commerce as a
physical flow of tangible goods affected more than the decision in E.C.
Knight that the acquisition of more than 90 percent of the capacity to
manufacture refined sugar lay outside the range of private decisions
regulable through the Commerce Clause.4 1 It also conditioned a much
more realistic judge's later inability to conceive of a commerce in entertainment, which in doctrinal expression precluded the application of
the antitrust statutes to the professional baseball business 42 - a subject of passing recent interest.
The goal of linking legal doctrine to political theory is a sound one,
and such a task requires not only erudition in the political theory liter38 See generally JOHN A. GARRATY, THE NEW COMMONWEALTH, 1877-1890, 85-89 (1968)
(describing the development of an integrated national railway system).
39 'I8 U.S. 394 (i886).

40 Fiss's account would profit in particular from consideration of Morton Horwitz's contentions that the entity theory of the corporation was developed in cases following County of Santa

Clara and that the doctrinal environment was still flexible in the early period of the Fuller Court.
See HORWITZ, supra note 23, at 69-93. The Fuller Court's approach to corporate theory is not
directly considered in Fiss's text; the metaphor of corporate personality under the Fourteenth
Amendment is mentioned in a single footnote (p. 135 n.84).
41 See United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. i, 16-17 (x895).
42 See Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs,
259 U.S. 200, 209 (1922).
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ature, but also precisely the powers of close doctrinal analysis that Fiss
brings to the reading of the Fuller Court's opinions. But those opinions are more complex symbols than either the doctrinalist or the high
political theorist can fully embrace within their two domains. If "culture" is, as one rather schematic social scientist defines it, "the symbolic aspect of social life," 43 then the intellectual history of the law is
also a field for the doing of cultural history. The cultural history of
judicial rhetoric will contribute much to the new new synthesis, the
need for which Fiss so profoundly, if ambivalently, demonstrates.
B.

National Power and the Civil War

I promised two suggestions in the structuralist intellectual history
of the Fuller Court. The second must be treated even more briefly
than the first, for it touches upon the subject of the single most important unwritten book in the history of American law. As Fiss quite
rightly points out, the ditch across the highway is only one of two
images that haunted the Court in Debs; the other was an image invoked by the words "civil war" (p. 71). For us, those images are remote and intangible, unless we are moved to substitute television
pictures from Bosnia or Rwanda. But every one of the Justices who
decided Debs - and indeed one or more sitting justices down to the
year of Franklin Roosevelt's election as President - had a personal
recollection of the meaning of civil war in the American landscape, or
44
on the surface of his own body.
Attitudes toward the power of majorities in legislatures, and in
particular toward increases in the power of the vastly expanded national government, would no doubt be affected by living through a
cataclysmic military confrontation that divided one's "nation," waged
.with such innovative ferocity that it recalibrated humanity's scale of
the possible in the industrial destruction of human life. We need, as
we need no other work, our first comprehensive study of the Civil
War in American legal history. It is, of course, no criticism of Professor Fiss that he has not written it. Yet the Civil War is almost absent
from his narrative, as it was not from the lives of the people about
whom he writes. One might almost suppose from the text before us
that the Civil War was the exclusive responsibility of Professor Fairman. I have never read a work about the post-bellum legal history of
the United States that mentioned the writing of Ambrose Bierce; not
even, to the best of my recollection, the much less revealing Stephen
43 DONALD BLACK, THE BEHAVIOR OF LAW 6I (1976).

44 Fiss finds "rather bizarre" Justice Holmes's annual celebration of his wounding at Ball's
Bluff and Antietam (p. 374 n.78). Perhaps it was, but I do not think one can satisfactorily discuss
the attitudes Holmes took toward many issues in American public life until one has considered
the forces operating in the background as they are revealed in this symbolic behavior. Dismissal
is a failure of the historian's imagination resulting from a stop in the contemporary mind.
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Crane. The new new synthesis, I think, will ultimately include consideration of the cultural influence of the civil war on the judicial forms
of social thought - an influence that lasted, one way or another, until
the Saturday morning in January 1932 when Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr., announced his retirement.
C.

Holmes and Natural Rights

That brings us back to the testator himself. This is the first volume in the Holmes Devise History in which Holmes himself appears,
and I believe it is fair to say that he gets rather unsympathetic treatment. Two aspects of Fiss's approach to Holmes, however, are important to the larger issues posed by his version of the new synthesis.
Identification with the Justices is a primary imaginative mechanism for Fiss's form of intellectual history, and it is plain that he does
not identify with Holmes. In general, he follows the approach of analyzing Holmes as a "spectator,"45 emphasizing what Morton Horwitz
calls Holmes's "detached olympian skepticism."46 For Fiss, Holmes
"was a fatalist and believed in the inevitable" (p. 143), "a view . . .
uniquely unappealing as a personal or professional ethic . . . that
mocked the pursuit of any ideal" (p. 184). This "Yankee from Olympus" view of Holmes is not entirely unwarranted, but it has always
seemed to me that it takes a part - the dismissive and patrician quality of Holmes's rhetoric - for the whole. In the context of Fiss's
larger interpretation of the Fuller Court, which stoutly denies any pervading flavor of unreality in the other Justices' opinions or extramural
descriptions of the social scene, an exclusive focus on Holmes's detachment is downright perverse. Perhaps Holmes's determinism, his "belief in the inevitable" was as deep as Fiss maintains, though I think
his belief in the contingency of the world to be far more important
than Fiss ever lets on. 47 Certainly he believed that law develops in the
context of social forces larger than those expressed in judicial opinions.
He began his study of the early common law with this idea in 1881,48
and it was expressed in his opinions on the great legal conflicts of his
45 The most frequently cited scholarship interpreting Holmes's thought in this book is Yosal
Rogat, The Judge as Spectator, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 213 (1964). Some interesting scholarship about

Holmes, including two major biographies, has appeared since then.
46 HORWiTZ, supra note 23, at 127.

47 Consider, for example, this:
Chauncey Wright, a nearly forgotten philosopher of real merit, taught me when young that

I must not say necessary about the universe, that we don't know whether anything is
necessary or not. ... So I describe myself as a bet-abilitarian. I believe that we can bet
on the behavior of the universe in its contact with us.
Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Aug. 3o, 1929), in I HOLMES-POLLOCK
LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK,
1874-1932, at 252 (Mark D. Howe ed., 1941). For other similar examples, see PHILIP P. WIENER,
EVOLUTION AND THE FOUNDERS OF PRAGMATISM 276 n.6 (Univ. of Pa. Press 1972) (1949).

48 See OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1-2 (1881).
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long day, throughout the first third of the twentieth century. But a
recognition of the profound forces shaping the rapidly changing American society was precisely what his brethren mostly lacked, while an
ironic doubt of the ability of judges to control the course of change is
only "uniquely unappealing as a personal or professional ethic" (p. 184)
to a certain kind of person and professional.
Nor did Holmes believe (to quote a particularly foolish statement
of Max Lerner's which Fiss seems implicitly to adopt) in "leaving the
legislature alone .

.

. from a deeper philosophy of leaving the cosmos

alone." 49 Holmes was more than willing to interfere in the legislature's right, for example, to embody certain social approaches in an
antitrust statute. Holmes wrote:
I am happy to know that only a minority of my brethren adopt an interpretation of the law which in my opinion would make eternal the bellum
omnium contra omnes and disintegrate society so far as it could into individual atoms. If that were its intent I should regard calling such a law
a regulation of commerce as a mere pretense. It would be an attempt to
reconstruct society. I am not concerned with the wisdom of such an attempt, but I believe that Congress was not entrusted by the Constitution
with the power to make it and I am deeply persuaded that it has not
tried.50
May we,

in passing, observe the relation between those annual

celebrations of the bullets at Ball's Bluff and the bellum omnium con-

tra omnes? As I have said elsewhere, 51 I agree with Horwitz and
other scholars in believing that the pole star of Holmes's thought,
throughout his life, was hostility to theories of natural rights. For him,
as for many others of his generation, the all-or-nothing character of
arguments over natural rights bore much of the responsibility for the
catastrophe of the war. For Fiss, who replaces the seeming connection
between the Fourteenth Amendment and the prewar ideology of natural rights with "the social contract tradition," it is perhaps more difficult to see what Holmes is bothered about, whether in Lochner or in
Northern Securities. Thus the most energetic and creative intelligence
in the history of American law makes his initial appearance - in the
history his fortune bought - in the guise of a sour tautologist, believing in the inevitable, grousing from the sidelines at the passing show.
49 MAX LERNER, THE MIND AND FAITH OF JUSTICE HOLMES: HIS SPEECHES, ESSAYS, LET-

TERS AND JUDICIAL OPINIONS xxxv (i943). This comment of Lerner's was unearthed by Alexander Bickel, who said it was "acutely observed," thus giving it what seems a termless lease on life.
ALEXANDER

M.

BICKEL, THE UNPUBLISHED

OPINIONS OF MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS: THE

SUPREME COURT AT WORK 221 (1957). (The work was itself a product of Bickel's research for
his assigned volume of the Holmes Devise History.) I have seen this comment repeated many
times; usually the quotation descends from Bickel. Never has anyone undertaken to explain, so
far as I recall, the alternative to leaving the cosmos alone which Holmes is supposed to have
rejected.
so Northern Sec. v. United States, r93 U.S. 197, 411 (19o4) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
S1 See Moglen, Transformation, supra note 27, at 1052.
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Perhaps this interpretation is destined to be accepted in the end, and if
so the very best thing to do is to let it have its way, but finding it
presented as an integral part of the intellectual rediscovery of the
Fuller Court, stamped with the imprimatur of Holmes's own profile in
gold leaf on the cover, is an irony that I think would have appealed
more to Holmes than it does to me.
So we end where we began, with the symbolic meaning of a book
jacket. Professor Fiss has written a fascinating and stimulating book,
masterfully contributing to an emerging scholarly movement that
promises one of the most satisfying effects that scholarship can have
- to recover for us the immediacy and importance of ideas long ignored or misinterpreted. But it is a contribution to the early stages of
that discussion and not, as the dead hand of the Devise inevitably suggests, the capstone on the arch. We owe Professor Fiss - along with
the other Devise scholars of his generation - a profound debt insomuch as they forbore rolling yet another weighty stone onto the chest
of alternative interpretation. The baneful influence of Felix Culpa with his twin impulses toward monumentalism and personal patronage
is almost vanquished. But it is hard to escape those covers, with
their gilding and their contentious history, long enough to admit that
the story they contain is merely one among many, or that the past is
still being born. As in so many other ways, the legacy of Justice
Holmes is with us yet, both blessing and curse, and will be for many
days to come.

